Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. To Improve Your Program, Let's Be Reasonable and Walk A Mile In Their Shoes
3. A Label for the Practice: MCDA
4. Generating Our Own DNS Abuse MCDA
5. Applying the MCDA for https://big-name-bank.example.com/login
6. Beyond Suspension: Considering Compromised Sites and Other Actions
7. Reflect On Your Own Abuse Reporting
8. Back to "Reasonable"
9. One Major Technical Headache
10. Final Thoughts

1. Introduction

In April 2024, ICANN and its contracted registrars and registries began to enforce voted-upon and approved changes to their respective agreements. In short, these changes stated that registrars and registries should implement more robust measures to mitigate DNS abuse. The language agreed upon, though imperfect in some eyes, is generally well-intended and is being enforced by most reputable registrars and registries. The frequent use of the word 'reasonable' in such policies can sometimes grant leeway for not taking action, but it represents the current consensus.

I will disclose that I co-founded and previously worked for CleanDNS, a company that mitigated DNS abuse on behalf of registrars and registries. During that time, I had the opportunity to review a lot of abuse reports and feeds from companies, governments, and individuals worldwide. I will not get into specifics of any entity's practices, but I intend to provide guidelines that might help improve the quality and actionability of abuse reports because a cleaner internet benefits everyone.

For the purposes of this post, let's say that you received or detected a suspicious link: https://big-name-bank.example.com/login. We're deliberately going to leave out how you received that link (e.g., email, SMS, web ad) and what exactly might be on the other side of that link for now, as those can be separate factors in a broader investigation, but our focus here is the domain itself in an abuse report.

2. To Improve Your Program, Let's Be Reasonable and Walk A Mile In Their Shoes

If you really want improve your abuse reporting, let us first walk a mile in the registrar and registry's shoes. Obviously, getting jobs with them and doing what they do first is a stretch, so to do that, let us explore what a reasonable anti-abuse program might look like and how they might take action.

• The registrar amendment says: "Registrar shall take reasonable and prompt steps to investigate and respond appropriately to any reports of abuse."
• The registry amendment says: "Where a Registry Operator reasonably determines, based on actionable evidence, that a registered domain name in the TLD is being used for DNS abuse, Registry Operator must promptly take the appropriate mitigation action(s) that are reasonablynecessary to contribute to stopping, or otherwise disrupting, the domain name from being used for DNS abuse."

Reasonable. Defined as "being in accordance with reason", "not extreme or excessive", and "moderate, fair," according to Merriam-Webster. But, we live in a post-truth world. It is safe to say that reasonable is a concept that now lives on a spectrum. And, based upon ICANN's nearly yearlong attempt to get .top in compliance for abuse, it is also safe to say that reasonable can exist as a measure of time.

But, this exercise is theory, and I really want to believe that most people and parties who signed that contract are reasonable in a traditional sense, so let's just assume we are not trying to address those who operate on spectrums and sliding scales and instead honor the written agreement.

3. A Label for the Practice: MCDA

Most organizations that handle abuse reports, whether registrars, registries, or their outsourced providers, try to make their decisions through some form of framework or scored process, even if it's not formally named. Though I have not officially seen this title used in this industry and in this specific context, the methodology is effectively a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) model.

In short, an MCDA takes a list of relevant criteria (or considerations) and applies scores and weights to each one for a given case. The outcome helps in making a more structured decision, backed by both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. For example, when looking at a new laptop, you might consider Price, Graphics Card, and Screen Size as your three primary factors. You find three laptops you like:

Laptop	Price	Graphics	Screen size
A	$1,000	Excellent	15.6"
B	$500	Average	17.3"
C	$750	Good	14.4"

Now, let's assign scores and weights to make a decision.

• Criteria & Weights:
  • Price (Lower is better): Weight = 40%
  • Graphics Card: Weight = 35%
  • Screen Size (Larger preferred for this example): Weight = 25%
• Scoring Scale (1-5, higher is better):
  • Price: $500 (5 pts), $750 (3 pts), $1,000 (1 pt)
  • Graphics: Excellent (5 pts), Good (3 pts), Average (1 pt)
  • Screen Size: 17.3" (5 pts), 15.6" (3 pts), 14.4" (1 pt)

Let's calculate:

• Laptop A:
  • Price: 1 pt * 0.40 = 0.40
  • Graphics: 5 pts * 0.35 = 1.75
  • Screen Size: 3 pts * 0.25 = 0.75
  • Total: 2.90
• Laptop B:
  • Price: 5 pts * 0.40 = 2.00
  • Graphics: 1 pt * 0.35 = 0.35
  • Screen Size: 5 pts * 0.25 = 1.25
  • Total: 3.60
• Laptop C:
  • Price: 3 pts * 0.40 = 1.20
  • Graphics: 3 pts * 0.35 = 1.05
  • Screen Size: 1 pt * 0.25 = 0.25
  • Total: 2.50

Based on this MCDA, Laptop B scores the highest, making it the preferred choice according to these specific criteria, scores, and weights.

Now, you might think to yourself that Laptop C seems like a better deal and you might be questioning the method. It suggests one of two things: either you need to keep shopping or you may be weighting and scoring differently than you might intend. However, tweaking the scales to come up with the answer you want is referred to as confirmation bias, and that is something you want to avoid. Although a system may be imperfect, if you can rely on it for the majority of cases and it is otherwise structured and repeatable, it is a good thing.

4. Generating Our Own DNS Abuse MCDA

Let's develop our own MCDA for our example domain, big-name-bank.example.com, to understand how a registrar or registry might consider whether to place a domain on serverHold or clientHold (statuses that effectively take a domain offline). Each of the following sections will list a consideration, a proposed scoring method, and a suggested weighting.

(Disclaimer: This is a hypothetical model for illustrative purposes. Actual decision-making processes will vary significantly, just like the above example with the laptop. And that's fine! The point is to build something so that you are not simply making decisions based upon how you feel that day or some other unstructured method.)

We'll use a simple weighting system:

• Low Weight: Multiplier of 1
• Medium Weight: Multiplier of 2
• High Weight: Multiplier of 3
• Critical Weight: Multiplier of 4

1. How old is the domain?

This is arguably one of the most important considerations. A domain registered only a few days ago is less likely to have established legitimate use and traffic compared to a domain registered during the dawn of the Internet that gets millions of visits per day. If an entity is going to suspend a domain, the risk of causing undue economic harm to a legitimate registrant is significantly lower if the domain is very new. Statistically, newly registered domains (NRDs) are more frequently used for abuse.

• Scoring:
  • 0-7 days old: 5 points
  • 8-30 days old: 4 points
  • 31-90 days old: 3 points
  • 91 days - 1 year old: 2 points
  • Over 1 year old: 1 point
• Weighting: High (x3)

2. Is the domain part of a known shared service or "ecosystem"?

This refers to domains provided by dynamic DNS services (e.g., yourname.ddnsprovider.org), blog hosting platforms (e.g., yourblog.blogspot.com), URL shorteners, or free web hosting that uses subdomains. At some point, a name under such a service stops being the direct responsibility of the domain's registrar/registry (e.g., for blogspot.com) and becomes the responsibility of the platform operator (Google, in the case of Blogspot). Action against the TLD or the main platform domain is rare unless abuse is systemic and the platform operator is unresponsive. For this MCDA, we're assuming example.com is a directly registered domain, not a subdomain from such a service. If big-name-bank.example.com was actually big-name-bank.somefreeservice.com, the approach would be different (contacting somefreeservice.com's abuse team). For a directly registered domain like example.com, this criterion assesses if example.com itself is a platform.

• Scoring:
  • No (domain is directly registered and not a platform itself): 3 points (neutral, as this is the common case for direct registration abuse)
  • Yes (e.g., example.com is a known DDNS provider, and the abuse is on customer.example.com): 0 points (action should be directed at the platform owner/registrant of example.com to handle their customer)
• Weighting: Medium (x2)

3. What kind of abuse was the domain reported for?

Registrars and registries are primarily obligated by ICANN policy to act on specific types of DNS abuse. DNS abuse is typically defined as "malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, and spam (when spam serves as a delivery mechanism for the other forms of DNS abuse)."

• Scoring:
  • Reported for defined DNS abuse (Phishing, Malware, Botnet C&C, Pharming, Spam as a vector for these): 5 points
  • Reported for other abuse types (e.g., copyright infringement, defamation, general spam not fitting the narrow definition): 0 points (for this MCDA focused on registrar/registry obligation)
• Weighting: Critical (x4) (If it's not DNS abuse, the rest of the scoring is largely moot for policy-mandated action).

Quick Tangent on Spam

Note that spam is only actionable by registrars/registries under ICANN policy "when spam serves as a delivery mechanism for the other forms of DNS abuse." This generally means spam that contains links to phishing/malware sites, or malicious attachments. Spam advertising discount/fake pharmaceuticals (note: "pharming" is not this, pharming is DNS poisoning/redirection), investment "opportunities," questionably sourced goods, etc., is typically NOT considered actionable DNS abuse by registrars or registries. Some might act based on their own AUP, but the industry, as a whole through ICANN policy, decided that mail filters are deemed sufficient or that this content is not their problem unless it directly facilitates other defined DNS abuse. This is despite the fact that criminal organizations are often behind such messaging. So... report spam carefully, with context, I guess?

4. URI Content (Brand & Intent)

The content of the full URI (Uniform Resource Identifier), not just the domain name, can strongly indicate intent. For example, https://example-generic.com/some-big-bank/login or our example https://big-name-bank.example.com/login. clearly signal an attempt to impersonate "some-big-bank" for "login" purposes.

• Scoring:
  • URI (subdomain, path, and/or query parameters) clearly contains a known brand name AND a clear "intent" keyword (e.g., login, signin, verify, update, recovery, secure, account, support): 5 points
  • URI contains a brand name OR an intent keyword, but not both clearly: 3 points
  • URI is generic or contains no clear brand/intent signals relevant to common abuse types: 1 point
• Weighting: Medium (x2)

5. Is there evidence (e.g., a screenshot, an email, logs) included with the report?

This is a binary assessment. Without evidence, a report is merely an unsubstantiated accusation.

• Scoring:
  • Yes, evidence is provided: 5 points
  • No evidence provided: 0 points
• Weighting: Critical (x4)

6. Does the evidence adequately substantiate the accusation for the specific domain?

Phishing is an attempt to obtain credentials by impersonating a login page or some sort of trusted entity. When reporting phishing for big-name-bank.example.com/login, a screenshot clearly showing the URL in the address bar, the big-name-bank logo and branding on the page, and login fields would be high-quality evidence. For malware, a link to a VirusTotal report for the URL/file, or a snippet of the code (if safe to share, e.g., de-fanged or as an image) with an explanation of how the domain is involved (e.g., hosting the malware, redirecting to it) is excellent. For spam leading to malware/phishing, attaching the full original email (e.g., as an .eml or .msg file) so headers can be analyzed showing how big-name-bank.example.com is involved is perfect.

• Scoring:
  • Clear, direct, and unambiguous evidence linking the domain to the specific DNS abuse type: 5 points
  • Evidence is present but requires some interpretation, or is slightly indirect: 3 points
  • Evidence is weak, circumstantial, or doesn't clearly implicate the domain: 1 point
  • Evidence provided is irrelevant to the reported domain or abuse type: 0 points
• Weighting: High (x3)

Quick Tangent on Some Data Sources

There are many security feeds and data sources that report domains as "bad" but may not provide a screenshot, full email, or raw malware sample with each alert. Because these groups might not provide that specific piece of "human-viewable" evidence in their feed, a registrar or registry might hesitate to take immediate action based solely on the feed alert if their policy demands visual proof for manual review. However, I suggest a nuanced take. Many of these reputable data sources have spent years building sophisticated infrastructure, honeypots, intelligence networks, and analytical methods to detect, capture, and validate abuse. This sustained effort, their established reputation, and methodologies are, in themselves, a form of evidence. It is certainly easier for an abuse desk to justify action with a tangible screenshot of a phishing page. But if a trusted data source can provide rich metadata (e.g., first seen, last seen, detection method, associated IPs/malware hashes, volume of sightings) to support their assertion, I would argue it warrants points and consideration.

7. How many unique, credible abuse reports or corroborating data points are there?

Multiple reports from different, credible sources (or strong corroboration from reputable security feeds/RBLs for the same active campaign) can increase confidence. One person repeatedly reporting the same domain with the same evidence might not add much weight beyond the first good report.

• Scoring:
  • 5+ unique, credible reports/strong corroborating reputable feed hits (e.g., multiple high-confidence RBL listings for the domain/URL): 5 points
  • 2-4 unique, credible reports/moderate corroborating feed hits: 3 points
  • 1 report (or multiple from the same source for the same thing without new evidence/strong feed corroboration): 1 point
• Weighting: Medium (x2)

8. What TLD is the domain on?

Believe it or not, the TLD itself can be a factor. Some TLDs have unfortunately gained reputations for being havens for abuse, often correlated with very low registration/renewal prices or lax oversight by the registry. Registrars/registries might be more inclined to act swiftly and decisively on domains in TLDs known for high abuse rates, as the likelihood of a false positive causing harm to a legitimate, high-value business might be perceived as lower. Conversely, for domains in more stringently managed or expensive TLDs (e.g., some nTLDs with specific community purposes, or traditionally "premium" TLDs), there might be a higher bar for evidence before action is taken.

• Scoring:
  • TLD with historically high abuse rates / very low promotional pricing: 3 points
  • TLD with average abuse rates / standard pricing: 2 points
  • TLD known for strict controls, high price, or specific legitimate community: 1 point
• Weighting: Low (x1) (This is more "icing on the cake" or a minor risk adjustment factor).

9. Has the domain example.com been involved in abuse before, and what is its general registration history?

This can be a trickier consideration, as not all registrars/registries have easy access to comprehensive historical abuse data for all domains they manage, especially if the domain has transferred between registrars. However, if available, this history can be insightful.

• If a domain (example.com) has a pattern of prior, verified abuse (especially similar types), was suspended, perhaps changed registrants (or was re-registered after dropping), and is now reported again, it suggests a potentially persistent bad actor or a compromised asset being repeatedly misused.
• Conversely, a long-standing domain with no prior abuse history suddenly being reported requires careful scrutiny to distinguish between a legitimate site being compromised versus a deliberately malicious registration.
• Scoring:
  • Clear history of similar abuse on this domain, especially if recent or involving quick re-registration after deletion: 5 points
  • Some prior unrelated abuse, or abuse long ago: 3 points
  • No known prior abuse history / long-standing clean record: 1 point
  • Insufficient data / NRD (use age score instead): 0 points (or score as 1 if applying a penalty for NRDs with no history is not desired).
• Weighting: Medium (x2)

10. Reproduction/Access Details Provided?

Sometimes abuse is geo-fenced or requires specific conditions to observe (e.g., specific user-agent, IP from a certain country, specific cookies). Providing these details helps the abuse team verify the report.

• Scoring:
  • Yes, clear, actionable details provided to reproduce/access the abusive content: 3 points
  • Yes, but details are too vague: 1 point
  • No such details provided: 0 points
• Weighting: Low (x1)

11. Evidence of Linked Malicious Infrastructure/Registrations?

This involves providing intelligence that connects the reported domain to a broader malicious operation. This is often qualitative but highly indicative of organized abusive intent.

• Scoring:
  • Strong evidence of linkage (e.g., multiple domains with identical non-standard WHOIS, registered in batch, using same highly specific/non-public nameservers, sharing dedicated IPs already known for abuse, identical malicious TXT records/site fingerprints): 5 points
  • Moderate evidence (e.g., a few domains with similar naming patterns or registration characteristics, hosted on IPs with some other suspicious domains): 3 points
  • Weak or singular links (e.g., one other unrelated domain on a large shared hosting IP): 1 point
  • No such evidence provided: 0 points
• Weighting: Medium (x2)

12. Is Your Message Easily Read and Parsed?

With the strides in AI and LLMs, it's becoming easier to run applications that parse key details out of an email. However, many perfectly good, pre-AI applications still parse messages, and in many cases, human analysts still review everything. For your report to be effective, it must be easy to process. Keep the message short, clear, and structured so it can be easily understood by any processor (be it software or a person). Furthermore, while English may be the lingua franca of the Internet, putting a little extra effort into accommodating the main language where the registrar/registry is located can go a long way in ensuring clarity and goodwill.

• Scoring:
  • Clear, concise, structured (e.g., uses headings for "Domain," "Evidence URL," "Abuse Type"), and in the primary business language of the recipient: 5 points
  • Generally clear but unstructured or overly long-winded. Written in English to a recipient whose primary language is different: 3 points
  • Unclear, hard to parse, or uses machine translation that is difficult to understand: 1 point
• Weighting: Low (x1)

5. Applying the MCDA for https://big-name-bank.example.com/login

Let's apply our 12-point MCDA to a few scenarios. Decision Threshold: For this model, let's assume a score of 105 or higher strongly suggests domain suspension. Scores 75-104 might trigger enhanced monitoring/formal warning. Below 75 might result in no immediate action based on this report alone unless critical criteria are maxed out. (Thresholds are arbitrary).

Criterion (#)	Weight Multiplier	Scenario 1: NRD, Clear Phishing, Full Detail	Score (S1)	Weighted (S1)	Scenario 2: Aged, URL only, Single Report	Score (S2)	Weighted (S2)	Scenario 3: NRD, Platform Subdomain*, Good Evidence, Multiple Reports	Score (S3)	Weighted (S3)
1. Domain Age	x3	0-7 days (5 pts)	5	15	>1 year (1 pt)	1	3	0-7 days (5 pts)	5	15
2. Part of Service/Ecosystem?	x2	No (3 pts)	3	6	No (3 pts)	3	6	Yes (0 pts) - Referred to platform	0	0
3. Type of Abuse (DNS abuse?)	x4	Phishing (5 pts)	5	20	Phishing (5 pts)	5	20	Phishing (5 pts)	5	20
4. URI Content (Brand & Intent)	x2	Brand + Intent (5 pts)	5	10	Brand + Intent (5 pts)	5	10	Brand + Intent (5 pts)	5	10
5. Evidence Provided?	x4	Yes (5 pts)	5	20	No (0 pts)	0	0	Yes (5 pts)	5	20
6. Evidence Substantiates?	x3	Clear & Direct (5 pts)	5	15	N/A (0 pts)	0	0	Good (3 pts)	3	9
7. Volume of Reports/Corroboration	x2	1 report + RBL hits (3 pts)	3	6	1 report (1 pt)	1	2	2-4 reports (3 pts)	3	6
8. TLD Reputation/Cost	x1	Average (2 pts)	2	2	Average (2 pts)	2	2	Low Cost/High Abuse TLD (3 pts)	3	3
9. Prior Abuse History of Domain	x2	NRD/No history (0 pts)	0	0	No known history (1 pt)	1	2	NRD/No history (0 pts)	0	0
10. Reproduction/Access Details	x1	Yes, clear (3 pts)	3	3	No (1 pt)	1	1	Yes, clear (3 pts)	3	3
11. Linked Malicious Infra/Regs?	x2	Moderate (3 pts)	3	6	No evidence (0 pts)	0	0	Weak (1 pt)	1	2
12. Message Clarity & Format	x1	Clear & Structured (5 pts)	5	5	Unstructured (3 pts)	3	3	Clear (5 pts)	5	5
TOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE				108			49			93
Suggested Action (based on threshold)				Suspend			No Action			Monitor/Warn (Escalate to Platform)

*Note for Scenario 3 (Platform Subdomain): If big-name-bank.example.com/login was actually hosted on big-name-bank.freehost.example.com, the primary responsibility for content removal shifts to the freehost.example.com platform operator. The registrar for example.com (the TLD of the platform) would typically only act against example.com if the platform itself is overwhelmingly abusive and unresponsive. The score of 88 might prompt the registrar of example.com to strongly notify their registrant (the owner of freehost.example.com) about the abuse originating from their platform, and demand action from them.

This MCDA model, while simplified, illustrates how multiple factors contribute to a decision. High scores in critically weighted areas (like "Type of Abuse" and "Evidence Provided?") are essential for a report to be considered actionable.

6. Beyond Suspension: Considering Compromised Sites and Other Actions

It's important to distinguish between domains registered for malicious purposes and legitimate domains that have been compromised (e.g., a small business website hacked to host phishing or malware).

While the MCDA above is primarily geared towards assessing newly registered or overtly malicious domains for suspension (serverHold or clientHold), the approach for compromised legitimate sites is often different:

• Notification is Key: The first step is usually to notify the registrant (if contactable) and the hosting provider about the compromise so they can clean the site. Many registrars and hosts have dedicated teams for this.
• Content Removal vs. Domain Suspension: The preferred outcome is the removal of the malicious content or fixing the vulnerability, rather than suspending the entire domain, which could affect legitimate services and users.
• Registrar/Host Remediation: If the registrar also provides the hosting for the compromised site, they might have tools or services to help the customer clean up, or they might quarantine the site at the hosting level.
• Suspension as a Last Resort: Domain-level suspension for a compromised legitimate site is typically a last resort. It might be considered if:
  • The registrant and host are unresponsive or unable to fix the issue.
  • The malicious activity is causing severe, ongoing harm (e.g., distributing ransomware, part of a critical botnet, child abuse content).
  • The volume of abuse originating from the compromised site is overwhelming.

In such extreme cases, the decision to suspend a legitimate, albeit compromised, domain involves balancing the harm caused by the abuse against the harm caused by taking the entire site offline. The "Domain Age" and "Prior Abuse History" criteria in the MCDA would heavily influence this – a long-standing, reputable domain (low score for malicious intent in those MCDA categories) is less likely to be summarily suspended.

Ultimately, the goal is to mitigate the abuse effectively while minimizing collateral damage to legitimate internet users and services.

7. Reflect On Your Own Abuse Reporting

Now, contemplate your abuse reporting or your organization's abuse reporting. How did you score? Are you being honest or did you stretch some? Did you have some "a-ha" moments? Did this spark some new ideas? That was the point of this exercise. But, if you are reading this and you are still not quite there on the topic, here are some pointers:

• Keep it brief and hit the factors that weigh the most. The person (or machine) at the other end is going to have some sort of rule (or coding) that likely follows something to this effect.
• Do not burn a lot of time on lengthy dissertations. By dissertations, I mean anything more than a paragraph, maybe two. The individuals tasked with handling abuse reports have a lot to get through. Regrettably, they will not read what you wrote.
• Simple changes can go a long way. If you are a group that typically reports brand infringement, try to get something that captures a login, credit card information, or some other form of personally identifable information (PII). Otherwise, it is highly likely that registrars and registries will label the issue as a "content" problem and state that it needs to go through a UDRP, close the case, and move on. ** We can discuss the issue of "fake shops" (a site that claims to sell a legitimate product but often just takes the money and sends nothing) in a different post.

8. Back to "Reasonable"

By no means is this an all-encompassing matrix or list of factors. I added and modified this several times myself while writing the article. There are certainly plenty of other variables that can come into play, such as specific legal requirements based upon an entity's jurisdiction or if you are an entity that is able to assert legal pressure. However, this framework is a foundation meant to build towards creating reasonable and actionable reports for those looking to build or improve upon their abuse reporting program.

But, as we previously discussed, the definition of reasonable exists on a spectrum that varies by organization. As such, here are some other ways to help improve the impact of your abuse reporting program:

• Keep detailed statistics and logs of your reports and their responses. Tracking response times, the types of actions taken (or not taken), and outcomes against the evidence you provided can help you identify which entities have a different definition of reasonable. This allows you to adjust your processes and expectations accordingly.
• Build relationships (if you are a high-volume reporter). If your organization submits a large number of high-quality reports, establishing a direct point of contact or using a trusted reporter program at major registrars can sometimes streamline the process and lead to better outcomes.
• Don't be afraid to complain to ICANN about compliance issues, especially if you have detailed, well-structured evidence of policy non-compliance by a registrar. A well-documented case showing a pattern of inaction on clear DNS abuse is more compelling than an isolated complaint. It may not lead to an immediate resolution for your specific case, but it adds to ICANN's own statistics and measures used to determine if a contracted party is meeting its obligations.
• Accept that your definition of reasonable, no matter how reasonable it is, may not match or matter. Registrars operate their businesses on very thin margins, which may drive their decision to not take action as it may harm their bottom lines. Registries may not want to be bothered with some issues, so definitions may get stretched to match opinions, giving cover to allow abuse to persist. Some entities will try to pass the buck downstream to ISPs, hosting companies, CDNs, DNS providers, so that they can scapegoat someone else. And, ultimately, some groups will do the absolute minimum because they do not care.

9. One Major Technical Headache

One of the key parts of the recent ICANN contract amendments was a change regarding how registrars and registries can receive abuse reports: webforms. The contract language for both registrars and registries contains a potent "or" statement.

• Registrars: "Registrar shall publish an email address or webform to receive such reports..."
• Registries: "...contact details including a valid email address or webform..."

Allowing registrars and registries to drop dedicated email support for abuse complaints (a long-standing best practice per RFC-2142) creates a new world of headaches for reporters. Your abuse reporting program, whether manual or automated, now has to take the following into consideration:

• Does the registrar or registry support an abuse@ email address, a webform, or both?
• Do the abuse@ emails actually get reviewed by a human, or do you just get an auto-reply redirecting you to a webform?
• Are the webforms scriptable for automated submissions, or are they protected by CAPTCHA and other measures that force manual entry for every single report?
• Is there a private API available for quality, high-volume reporters?

The reason the industry moved in this direction is understandable, if not ideal for reporters: the emails they were receiving were often too voluminous and varied too greatly in quality and format. A webform forces submissions into a standard structure that is more easily ingested and processed by automated systems. But, much like the initial lack of a unified plan when GDPR came into effect, registrars and registries have largely all done their own thing, creating a fragmented landscape that can be a massive burden and barrier for reporting abuse, whether you are an individual or a large entity.

10. Final Thoughts

Navigating the world of DNS abuse reporting can feel like an uphill battle. The rules can seem arbitrary, the processes opaque, and the outcomes inconsistent. However, by approaching your reporting with a structured, evidence-based mindset, you fundamentally shift the dynamic.

The MCDA framework isn't a magic formula, but a way to think like an abuse desk analyst—to anticipate the questions they will ask and provide the answers upfront. A report that is clear, well-supported, and demonstrates obvious harm is significantly harder to ignore.

While new challenges like the fragmentation of reporting channels exist, the new policies also provide a stronger foundation for holding contracted parties accountable. Every well-structured report you submit contributes not only to mitigating a specific threat but also to the broader ecosystem's health. It adds to the data that policymakers, registrars, and ICANN itself use to measure the state of abuse online. Keep fighting the good fight—your efforts do make a difference.